Abstract-Physical Unclonable Functions evaluate manufacturing variations to generate secure cryptographic keys for embedded systems without secure key storage. It is explained how methods from coding theory are applied in order to ensure reliable key reproduction. We show how better results can be obtained using code classes and decoding principles not used for this scenario before. These methods are exemplified by specific code constructions which improve existing codes with respect to error probability, decoding complexity and codeword length.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic applications require random, unique and unpredictable keys. Since most cryptosystems need to access the key several times, it usually has to be stored permanently, which is a potential vulnerability regarding security. Implementing secure key generation and storage is therefore an important and challenging task.
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a, typically digital, circuit that possesses an intrinsic randomness due to process variations during manufacturing and can therefore be used to generate a key. This key can be reproduced on demand. However, the PUF output when reproducing a key varies, which can be interpreted as errors. Thus, error correction must be used in order to compensate this effect. Previous work on this topic used standard constructions, e.g. an ordinary concatenated scheme of a BCH and Repetition code in [1] . In this paper, we extend our results from [2] and propose code constructions based on generalized concatenated, Reed-Muller and Reed-Solomon codes for the application with PUFs, which have advantages with respect to decoding complexity, error correction capability and code length. The paper first describes PUFs and explains how coding theory is applied to realize key generation and reproduction using PUFs. Section III describes methods and codes suitable for this scenario. Finally, specific code constructions, improving those commonly used for PUFs, exemplify these methods in Section IV. We summarize the results in the last section.
II. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
In [3] , a PUF is described as a physical entity which uses an input (challenge) in order to produce an output (response), where a challenge can result in different responses when applied to a certain PUF instance several times. The distance of two such responses is called intra-distance 1 . Reasons for these varying responses are random noise, measurement 1 With distance we mean the Hamming distance d H .
uncertainties, aging and changing environmental conditions like temperature or supply voltage. A small response intradistance is preferred, since there is a need for reproducibility of responses. The distance of the responses of two different PUF instances using the same challenge is called inter-distance, and results from variations during the manufacturing process. This measure gives us the distinguishability of different PUF instances, which is preferred to be large. Unclonable means the hardness of manufacturing two PUFs with the same challengeresponse-behavior. There are many possibilities to realize PUFs, e.g. delay-based (e.g. Ring Oscillator PUFs) or memorybased (e.g. SRAM PUFs). An overview of popular types can be found in [3] .
PUFs can be used in order to realize secure key generation and storage for cryptographic applications. Due to static randomness over the PUFs lifetime, it is possible to regenerate a key repeatedly on demand instead of storing it permanently. As described above, PUF responses are not exactly reproducible and therefore a response cannot be used as key directly. Hence, methods of coding theory must be used.
One way to realize key reproduction is the Code-Offset Construction [4] (cf. Figure 1) . First, for a given challenge a response r is generated by the PUF (I). The Helper Data Generation (II) subtracts a random codeword c of a given code C(n, k, d) from r and stores the result e = r − c in the Helper Data Storage (III). Afterwards, the response r can be deleted. Hence, if an attacker is able to read this storage, he is left with an uncertainty as large as the number of codewords. For regenerating the original response, the same challenge must be used to obtain a response r ′ which is likely to differ slightly from r. For most PUFs, this can be interpreted as an additive error r ′ = r + e ′ = c + e + e ′ , resulting from a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p, where p is given by the PUF. If wt H (e ′ ) = d H (r, r ′ ) is within the error correction capabilities of the code, the Key Reproduction (IV ) procedure is able to reproduce the first-time response r by decoding r ′ − e = c + e + e ′ − e = c + e ′ with a decoder of the code C(n, k, d) (decoding resultĉ).
Other possibilities for implementing key reproduction are the Syndrome Construction [4] , Index-Based Syndrome Coding [5] , Complementary Index-Based Syndrome Coding [6] and Differential Sequence Coding [7] . One main challenge is to find good codes that can be used for key reproduction.
If an attacker is able to read e from the helper data storage, his uncertainty about the response r is equal to the uncertainty of c, namely 2 k codewords. Hence, the uncertainty of the extracted key cannot be larger than the dimension of the used code. Also, this uncertainty is even smaller due to the fact that the PUF responses themselves are not necessarily independent and uniformly distributed. Since we want to obtain a uniformly distributed cryptographic key,r must be hashed by a cryptographic hash function (V ) before it can be used. The combination of key reproduction and a hash function is usually referred to as Fuzzy Extractor [8] .
III. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
Code design for key reproduction in PUFs is analog to standard problems in coding theory for a given channel, e.g. a BSC with crossover probability p. A typical goal is to design a code with a block error probability P err smaller than a certain threshold. The dimension of the code must be at least the length of the key that should be generated. Also, the designed codes must be binary. The length of the codewords can be chosen arbitrarily, but for generating one key, at least as many bits as the codeword length have to be extracted from the PUF, which determines the size of the PUF. Since the decoder is usually part of an embedded security device, the decoding method must be easy to implement in hardware. Here, we describe suitable construction and decoding methods.
A. Generalized Concatenated Codes
The authors of [9] found that concatenated codes are advisable for implementing key reproduction. Instead of ordinary concatenated codes, we propose using Generalized Concatenated (GC) codes as introduced in [10] and [11] . A GC code with given n and d contains more codewords and hence has a higher code rate than an ordinary concatenated code with the same parameters.
The main idea of GC codes is to partition an inner code B (1) of length n i into multiple levels of subcodes. Let B (i) j denote the j-th subcode at partition level i. The goal is to create partitions such that the minimum distances of the subcodes increase strictly monotonically from level to level in the partition tree. Each codeword of B (1) can be uniquely determined using a numeration of the partition. This numeration is protected by outer codes. Code A (i) of length n o denotes the outer code which protects the numeration of the partition from level i to level i + 1. For a detailed description of GC codes, we refer to [11] . and d = 2 m−r . It can be defined recursively using the Plotkin Construction [11] :
B. Reed-Muller Codes
RM codes work well for PUF key reproduction due to an easily implementable decoding, which can also be done recursively using Algorithm 1, which can correct up to τ errors and δ erasures if 2τ + δ < d. Erasures are treated as third symbol ⊗ besides 0 and 1, and the operation + is extended such that ⊗ + x = x + ⊗ := ⊗ for all x ∈ {0, 1, ⊗}. Within the description of Algorithm 1, + is applied component-wise. Decoding of the repetition and parity check codes (base cases of the recursion) works as usual by ignoring all code positions with erasures. Alternatively, RM codes can be defined as GC codes and decoded using the algorithm described in [12] .
Using RM codes in the PUF scenario is reasonable because Algorithm 1 can be implemented efficiently. Since it can handle both errors and erasures, it also works in combination with Generalized Minimum Distance decoding (cf. Section III-D). Furthermore, RM codes are proper for partitioning because RM(r i , m) ⊆ RM(r j , m) for all r i ≤ r j and partitioning of linear block codes into cosets of a linear subcode can be done easily [11] . This property makes them suitable in a GC code. However, RM codes are not maximum distance separable. Also, the dimension k cannot be chosen arbitrarily. RM codes have been used before for key reproduction in PUFs [6] , [14] .
C. Reed-Solomon Codes
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes are one of the most commonly used codes in applications of coding theory due to the existence of efficient decoding algorithms. We describe the basics of RS codes according to [11] . Let F q be a finite field and α a generator of F *
and the inverse DFTc(
Definition 2 (Reed-Solomon codes). A Reed-Solomon code over a field F q is defined as
RS codes are maximum distance separable (MDS), that means d = n−k+1. There are several algorithms for decoding RS codes both for decoding up to half the minimum distance and beyond. An overview of the most important decoding methods for RS codes can be found in [15] .
In this paper, we use the method of Power Decoding [16] which is easily implementable using Shift-Register Synthesis and can correct beyond half the minimum distance for small code rates. Since we use RS codes with small rates in our construction, this method suits perfectly. The idea of Power Decoding is to power the received word r(x) = c(x) + e(x) with some positive integer ℓ:
such that for some i, e i = 0 yieldsẽ i = 0, but not necessarily the other way round. Hence,
) and the indices of the nonzero coefficients ofẽ
[ℓ] (x) are a subset of those of e(x). From the properties of the DFT, we know that
We denote the maximum ℓ such that this inequality is fulfilled by ℓ max . This approach is usually referred to as Virtual Interleaving. Since we know that the errors in all received words r
[ℓ] (x) are at the same positions, collaborative decoding as described in [17] can be used to improve the decoding capability. It is shown in [16, Section V] that, except for a negligible probability of decoding failure, Power Decoding using powers up to ℓ ≤ ℓ max can correct up to
errors. It can also be shown that ℓ max is upper bounded by
Combining (1) and (2), we obtain a maximum error correction radius as shown in Figure 2 . Note that for low rate codes the algorithm can correct far beyond half the minimum distance. Most RS decoding algorithms can be modified such that they can correct erasures and errors [11] . This modification has the same effect as decoding a punctured RS code. Assuming that when transmitting a codeword from RS(q; n, k), δ erasures and τ errors occurred, we can simply transform the decoding 
D. Generalized Minimum Distance Decoding
Generalized Minimum Distance (GMD) decoding (cf. [18] ) is a method to increase the number of correctable errors beyond half the minimum distance by incrementally declaring the least reliable positions of a received word to be erasures. Hence, soft-information and error-erasure decoders are needed.
E. Maximum Likelihood Decoding
Maximum Likelihood (ML) decoding finds the most likely codeword with respect to the received word. Thus, decoding only fails if two or more codewords are equally likely. For most codes, no sufficiently fast ML decoder exists, but it is applicable to codes with small dimension. Since the inner codes of GC codes often fulfill this requirement, we use ML decoders in order to decrease decoding failure probabilities of the inner codes.
IV. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS USING GC CODES
In this section, we show how codes for key reproduction in PUFs can be constructed using RM and RS codes in combination with GC codes. First, we describe how codes for PUFs can be constructed based on GC codes in general. As a starting point, the desired codeword length n and a dimension k which is at least the key size must be chosen. If the information theoretic uncertainty of the source is small, a larger k together with a hash function can be used to create an output with good cryptographic properties. Next, two numbers n i and n o such that n i n o = n must be found, where n i denotes the length of the inner codes and n o denotes the length of the outer codes. n i must be chosen large enough such that an inner code with this length exists which can be partitioned easily. The easiest way to define a partitioning is to take a linear code and a linear subcode of it. Then, all distinct cosets of this subcode form a partitioning of the code. If the large code has dimension k i and the subcode has dimension k i+1 < k i , then the number of partitions is q ki−ki+1 (here, we only consider binary inner codes, so q = 2). Afterwards, good outer codes with length n o have to be chosen to protect the partition indices for each partition level. The dimensions of the codes must be chosen such that their sum is equal to the desired dimension k of the entire code. Usually, the dimensions are chosen such that they increase with the partition level.
We already described in Section III-B why RM codes are suitable as inner codes. Due to their easily implementable decoding algorithms, they can also be used as outer codes. An example construction using only RM codes is given in Section IV-A, which has better properties than the codes commonly used for error correction in PUFs. However their dimension cannot be chosen arbitrarily, which restricts their use as outer codes. Therefore, in Section IV-C we also show how RS codes can be used instead.
A. Reed-Muller Example Construction
In [1] , a design for cryptographic key generators based on PUFs was introduced, using a concatenation of a (318, 174, 35) BCH code and a (7, 1, 7) Repetition code in order to generate a 128 bit key with error probability P err = 10 −9 . The paper considers error models with BSC crossover probabilities p ranging from 0.12 to 0.14, leading to different PUF entropies. The higher this entropy is, the fewer bits are needed to hash to the same key size. For a minimum code dimension, we consider the maximum entropy case with p = 0.14. For a fair comparison to [1] , the block error probability P err should be roughly 10 −9 for a 128 bit key. Thus, we have to choose a code with dimension ≥ 128 and aim for a block length less than the one used in [1] , namely 2226.
We give a more detailed description and analysis of the example code construction which we introduced in [2] . The example improves existing schemes in code length, block error probability and easiness of the implementation. We choose a generalized concatenation of an inner (16, 5, 8) Simplex code B (1) and RM codes of length 128 as outer codes A (i) . Hence, we obtain a code of length 128 · 16 = 2048, i.e. it can be represented as a matrix with 128 rows, each containing a codeword of the Simplex code. The inner code B (1) is partitioned into 16 disjoint subcodes B (2) i with parameters (16, 1, 16 ), e.g. B (2) 0000 can be the repetition code of length 16 and all other elements of the partition are its distinct cosets. The enumeration i ∈ {0000, . . . , 1111} is then protected by four RM(1, 7) codes, one for each bit. Since the subcodes B (2) i contain exactly two elements each, we can again partition them into subcodes containing only one element, B (2) i,0 and B (2) i,1 . The enumeration {0, 1} is then protected by a RM(4, 7) code. The partition tree is illustrated in Figure 3 . Thus, we can encode 4 · 8 + 99 = 131 ≥ 128 bits. Encoding is illustrated in Figure 4 and explained in Table I. A detailed description of the decoding process is visualized in Figure 5 and explained in Table II . The soft information mentioned in Steps (c) and (g) is obtained from the number of errors corrected in Steps (a) and (e) respectively. 2 Note that the resulting code has dimension 131 = 32+99, where 32 = 4·8 bits are encoded using A (1) and 99 bits are encoded using A (2) . 
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Result of
Step (b). (128 × 1)-matrix which is codword of A (2) . Each row provides second partition index j (1 bit) for encoding
Step (c) (chooses B
i,j ).
(c) Takes row-wise partition indices i (from III) and j (from IV ) and writes the codeword contained by B
i,j (note that this code contains only one codeword) in the corresponding row of V .
V
GC codeword (length n = 128 · 16 = 2048) obtained by encoding the k = 131 bits from I and II.
Table I LEGEND TO FIGURE 4 (ENCODING).
B. Analysis of the RM-Example
We derive an upper bound on the block error probability P err of the code described in Section III-D. For GC codes, decoding is realized in several steps. We look at the events S 1 , . . . , S r , where S i is the event that decoding in step i fails. Since the decoder is only successful if all steps work properly, we can give an upper bound for P err using the Union Bound:
Hence, the block error probability is upper-bounded by the sum of the error probabilities of each step. In the example from Section III-D, we can group the decoding process into two major steps, namely S 1 consisting of steps (a) − (d) and S 2 with (e) − (h) (cf. Table II) . P (S 1 ) can be calculated by transforming the BSC with p = 0.14 into a binary error and erasure channel by ML decoding of the inner Simplex (16, 5, 8) code. By simulation, we obtain the following parameters of this transformed channel:
P (error) = 0.020698, P (erasure) = 0.155532.
The
is the number of errors and δ is the number of erasures. Using this condition, we obtain
The probability P (S 2 ) can be calculated similarly. It turns out that P (S 2 ) ≈ 1.48 · 10 −9 . Using these results, we obtain the following upper bound on P err :
However, this probability can be further decreased by using GMD decoding. This effect is not easy to analyze analytically, but has a large impact on the error probability. Simulations have shown that the actual block error probability is given by:
Compared to the code construction used in [1] , we obtain a smaller block error probability using GC codes. We have also decreased the codeword length from 2226 to 2048. Another advantage of our construction is that decoding is easier to implement, since we only use codes with decoders working over F 2 . Table III summarizes the improvements. 
C. Reed-Solomon Construction
The result of Section IV-A provides a code construction which improves commonly used coding schemes for key reproduction in PUFs. However, the use of RM codes as outer codes in the GC scheme is not as flexible as sometimes desired. Thus, we show how GC codes can be constructed using RS codes as outer codes and improve the code construction from Section IV-C in the code length.
The possible length n o of the outer RS codes is upper bounded by their field size, which again is restricted by the number of partitionings. This means that the length of the inner codes n i must be sufficiently large, such that at each partition 
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Result of
Step (c). Columns are ∈ RM(1, 7). Rows give indices i (4 bits) which specify in which partition B
(2) i the rows must be decoded in the second part of the algorithm.
(d)
Extraction of the first 32 = 4 · 8 information bits (each column of IV is a codeword of a C(128, 8, 64) code which corresponds to exactly one information word of length 8).
(e) Row-wise ML decoding in B
i , where i denotes the partition index for each row given by the corresponding row of IV .
V
Result of
Step (e). Rows are codewords of B 
(f )
Remapping of every row (codewords of B 
V I
Result of Step (f ).
(g) Error-erasure decoding (optional: GMD using soft information obtained from step (e)) of the column in A (2) = RM(4, 7) = C(128, 99, 8). If decoding fails: Declare failure of algorithm.
V II
Result of
Step (g). Column contains codeword of A (2) .
(h) Extraction of remaining 99 information bits which correspond to the A (2) = C(128, 99, 8) codeword in Block V II. Table II  LEGEND TO FIGURE 5 (DECODING). level i, partitions of B (i) in more subcodes than the length n o of the outer codes are possible.
We first illustrate how much the code rate can be reduced when using RS codes in a concatenated scheme by giving an example of an ordinarily concatenated code based on RS codes. The example uses a RM(1, 5) = C(32, 6, 16) code as inner code which transforms the BSC with p = 0.14 into a binary error and erasure channel with P (error) = 0.003170 and P (erasure) = 0.017605 using ML decoding. As outer code, we use a RS(2 6 ; n, k) code with n ≤ 2 6 = 64 and k = 22 because the overall dimension of the code must be 6k ≥ 128 bits. If we choose n = 64, we obtain a code with length n = 64 · 32 = 2048 and we can calculate that P err ≈ 6.79 · 10 −37 using the same equation as (4) . Since this probability is by far smaller than necessary, we can use the flexibility of RS codes and reduce n arbitrarily. This is easy to realize with the same decoder as for the RS(2 6 ; 64, k) code by declaring some codeword positions to be erasures. If we use a RS(2 6 ; 36, 22) code, the code length can be reduced to 1152 and we obtain a block error probability of P err ≈ 1.19 · 10 −10 . Note that we have already reduced the code length by half compared to the construction in [1] .
In the following, we give an example that reduces the code length even more by using GC codes. We partition an extended BCH [11] Figure 6 . Encoding and decoding is done similarly to the RM example in Section IV-A. We analyze the decoding capabilities of the code step by step. In Step 1, ML decoding in B
(1) (32, 11, 12) transforms the channel in a binary error and erasure channel 3 with P (error) = 0.037808 and P (erasure) = 0.174488. Decoding up to half the minimum distance in the outer code would leave us with P (S 1 ) ≈ 1.03 · 10 −8 , which is too high. But since the RS(2 5 ; 32, 2, 31) code has a low rate, we can apply Power Decoding (cf. Section III-C) and obtain an error probability of P (S 1 ) ≈ 1.48 · 10 −11 .
Step 2 transforms the BSC into a binary error and erasure channel with P (error) = 0.0032167 and P (erasure) = 0.0175397. Hence, decoding in RS(2 5 ; 32, 19, 12) yields an error probability of P (S 2 ) ≈ 3.11 · 10 −10 . The last step has P (S 3 ) ≈ 2.13 · 10 −11 . Hence, the overall block error probability is upper bounded by P err ≤ (3) P (S 1 ) + P (S 2 ) + P (S 3 ) ≈ 3.47 · 10
−10
Thus, the example satisfies the constraints and reduces the code length to n = 32 · 32 = 1024.
V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
We explained how coding theory is used for reproducing cryptographic keys using PUFs. Furthermore, we proposed code constructions and decoding methods which improve existing coding schemes for PUFs and illustrated these by giving examples. Table III summarizes the properties of the example constructions. It can be seen that our approach can achieve significantly reduced codelengths, block error probabilities or decoding complexity. In future work, more methods from coding theory can be examined for suitability in this setting. GC RS (IV-C) 3.47 · 10 −10 1024 F 2 5   Table III  COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CODE CONSTRUCTIONS. 
